Throughout 2006 and 2007 Iran has engaged in the continued development and testing of its missile systems. These tests include the successful launch of Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles, with ranges of 1,300 km and 2,200 km respectively. These tests represent noteworthy advances in Iranian ballistic missile technology and capabilities. In addition, intelligence reports allege that a covert Iranian program known as "Project 111" is carrying out plans to arm Shahab-3 missiles with nuclear warheads if and when Iran develops such warheads.
Additional missile tests took place in early 2007, which included the testing of the Zelzal and Fajr-5 missiles, as well as an SSN4 or Raad cruise missile. In addition to the missile tests that Iran has recently carried out, it also tested a new space launch vehicle (SLV). Iran asserts that the launch was intended for research purposes to aid in the eventual launching of satellites, not missiles. In April 2006, Iran reportedly purchased surface-to-surface missiles, known as BM-25s, from North Korea. The BM-25 has a range of 2,500 km and is a single stage liquid fueled missile. The purchase allegedly gives Iran a longer reach than the Iranian made Shahab-4. In response to the concerted efforts Iran has been making to improve and expand its missile capabilities, the United States plans to install a missile defense system in Poland in order to protect Europe and the U.S. from a possible missile attack from Iran.
Over the past 25 years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued an aggressive ballistic missile and long-range artillery rocket development program. Since the late 1980s, this program has been assigned a national priority at least equal to that of the nuclear program. Although Iran's economy is not flourishing, unemployment is high and there is a low level of internal unrest concerning the restrictive nature of the Islamic government, ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development continue to receive very high commitments of financial and material resources—and will likely do so for the foreseeable future.
The development of ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets within Iran has proceeded in a relatively steady, logical, and predictable manner. Today, it possesses the second largest (behind the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—DPRK) ballistic missile force in the third world and is near to developing a space launch vehicle and medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles that could threaten Europe and the continental United States. This is an ominous development since there is little doubt that Iran perceives the ballistic missile to be the delivery system of choice for nuclear weapons.
Iran currently possesses the capability to employ ballistic missiles and/or long-range artillery rockets against its regional neighbors, Israel, and U.S. forces deployed in the region. Given favorable conditions, Iran is currently on track to be able to extend its ballistic missile capabilities to include Southern Europe, North Africa, and South Asia by 2005-2010 and possibly the continental United States by 2015. These estimates could be somewhat accelerated or easily delayed dependent upon a host of international and domestic factors that cannot be accurately predicted.
A large number of Iran's ballistic missiles and/or long-range artillery rocket systems currently possess the capability to deliver conventional high explosive, submunition, chemical, biological and radiological dispersion warheads. Given a favorable set of circumstances, Iran could achieve a true nuclear weapons delivery capability within the next five years.
The development of ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets within Iran can be divided into three broad chronological stages: Pre-revolution (1977-1979); Post-revolution and the war with Iraq (1980-1988); and Post-war (1989-present). The latter two stages may themselves be subdivided into distinct phases. This development has been strongly influenced by a number of interrelated factors, all of which have varied considerably in importance over time. These include, but are not limited to,
- Necessities of war and the short distance to Iraqi strategic targets.
- Quantity and quality of missiles and missile-related technology acquired.
- Size and experience of the indigenous missile-related manpower pool.
- Capabilities of the Iranian military-industrial infrastructure.
- Desire to possess the capability to strike directly at Israel and U.S. military facilities within South Asia.
- Organizational, political, and religious discord amongst the various entities engaged in the design, development, and production of ballistic missiles.
Early Developments Under the Shah Pahlavi (1977-1979)
The origins of the Iranian missile program date back to the late 1970s and the last years that the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ruled Iran.
In July 1977, Iranian Vice Minister of War General H. Toufanian traveled to Israel and met with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann. Among a number of joint Israeli-Iranian military projects discussed at these meetings was "Project Flower." This project was focused on the development of a longer ranged (150-200km) and more heavily armed version of the Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile (not as sometimes reported with the development of a ballistic missile based upon Israeli Jericho surface-to-surface missile technology). It is possible, however, that this subject was discussed, since General Toufanian apparently attended a test-launch of a Jericho missile. Also discussed at these meetings was an Iranian interest in extending Project Flower to include a future submarine launched variant and Iranian concerns over missile and nuclear developments in India and Pakistan.
The following year, Iran made a down payment for Project Flower by providing Israel with $280 million worth of oil. To support this project, a team of Iranian experts began construction of a missile assembly facility near Sirjan, in south central Iran, and a missile test range near Rafsanjan. During February 1979, the Imperial Iranian regime of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi collapsed, and along with it died Project Flower.
Islamic Revolution and the War With Iraq (1980-1988)
At the time of the Islamic fundamentalist revolution in 1979, Iran had no long-range artillery rocket or ballistic missile capabilities to speak of. This situation remained essentially unchanged through the following year when Iraq launched its invasion. The continued Iraqi use of FROG-7A artillery rockets against Iranian cities led to Iran's interest in long-range artillery rockets and ballistic missiles. Thus began a see-saw race with Iraq for superiority in these weapons. This race would last throughout the eight-year-long war. It would bring about the development of an indigenous Iranian missile industry, two "wars of the cities," and the evolution of a strategic concept concerning the military and political importance of ballistic missiles. Iran, however, lost both the ballistic missile race and arguably the war, which only served to reinforce its desire to possess and produce ballistic missiles.
In 1982, as the war dragged on into its second year, Iraqi operations entered a new phase in which it expanded the use of FROG-7As strikes and the first employment (three attacks in 1982) of the Scud-B short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to strike at the Iranian strategic rear.The casualties caused by these attacks and the Iranian inability to respond in kind resulted in an effort to acquire long-range artillery rockets and ballistic missiles—especially the Scud-B. Iran also established several indigenous ballistic missile and rocket programs. The acquisition effort was thwarted from its inception by a number of significant factors. The Soviet Union was then supplying Iraq with the Scud-B and those countries to which the Soviets had previously sold Scud-Bs were under contract not to transfer them to third parties. Of the nations with whom Iran had relations, only two were likely to run the risk reselling their Scud-Bs: Libya and Syria. Negotiations with both countries are believed to have begun during early 1983. Sometime during 1984, Iran successfully concluded a secret agreement with Libya for the purchase of a small number of MAZ-543P transporter-erector launchers (TELs) and Scud-B missiles. The details of the early Iranian ballistic missile and rocket programs, as well as their immediate objectives, are presently unknown. the end of 1982, there appears to have been four major components—indigenous design and production of crude artillery rockets, the indigenous design and production of a artillery rocket comparable to the FROG-7A, the acquisition of Scud-B missiles, and the reverse engineering and production of the Scud-B. The greatest obstacle to developing any indigenous capabilities was the status of the Ministry of Defense's Defense Industries Organization (DIO), and later Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Construction Jihad, industrial infrastructure. As these components developed over the years, they would actually consist of a series of concurrent programs pursued semi-independently by the Air Force, DIO, and the IRGC Construction Jihad. This often resulted in unnecessary competition, the dilution of effort, and abortive programs.
It was during this period that Iran also approached both the DPRK and People's Republic of China (PRC) seeking missile technology and tactical ballistic missiles in the Scud-B class. At that time, neither country possessed a system of the type requested by Iran. The DPRK, however, had acquired small numbers of Scud-Bs (i.e., R-17Es) from Egypt and was pursuing a multifaceted missile research and development program.The goal was to produce both reverse-engineered and extended-range variants of the R-17E known as the Hwasong-5 and the Hwasong-6, respectively.
As a result of the 1984 agreement with Libya, approximately two MAZ-543P TELs and 20 Scud-B missiles are believed to have reached Iran during January or February 1985.Upon arrival, the missiles were assigned to a newly created battalion-sized missile unit of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force, whose personnel had received preliminary training in both Libya and Syria. In approximately one month, the missile unit attained initial operational capability.
On 12 March 1985, Iran conducted its first ballistic missile attack against Iraq, when at 0240 hours, troops launched a Libyan supplied Scud-B at Kirkuk. This was followed two days later by an early morning attack on the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.By 1 April, a total of eight Scud-Bs had been fired. The Iranians identified the unit that conducted these attacks as the Khatam ol-Anbya (a.k.a., Khatam-ul-Anbia, "Seal of the Prophets") missile unit. During the next three months, both sides conducted a small-scale "War of the Cities," with Iran launching missiles at Baghdad and Iraq countering with Scud-B missile attacks upon number of Iranian border cities. As a result of a cease-fire agreement in early June, the first "War of the Cities" came to an end and neither side is reported to have launched any missiles for the remainder of the year.
Two weeks after the cease-fire, Hashemi-Rafsanjani led a high-level delegation to the PRC and DPRK. In both countries, Hashemi-Rafsanjani secured increased military assistance and agreements to sell Iranian missiles and engage in bilateral missile technology exchanges. Specifically, during the visit to the PRC, he secured a PRC agreement in the following missile-related areas:
- The delivery of HY-1 silkworm and HY-2 seersucker coastal defense missiles beginning in 1986 and assistance in establishing an assembly facility for these missiles.
- The continued delivery of HN-5A and HQ-1/2 SAMs.
- Technology transfer and long-term assistance in the development of Iranian ballistic missiles and artillery rockets.
The visit to the DPRK was equally fruitful, and he secured DPRK assistance in the following missile-related areas:
- The delivery of HN-5A SAMs and assistance in establishing an assembly facility for these and the HQ-1/2 SAMs.
- Long-term assistance in the establishment of a factories to manufacture the HN-5A and HQ-2.
Technology transfer for new Iranian missiles and artillery rockets.
- Assistance in the establishment of a factory to assemble the DPRK Scud variant missiles.
Beginning in June 1986, Iran initiated isolated Scud-B attacks against Baghdad and Kirkuk. By the end of 1986, Iran had launched an additional eight missiles, bringing its total of Scud-Bs fired against Iraq to approximately 22.
Sometime in June 1987, Iran concluded a follow-on arms agreement worth an estimated $500 million with the DPRK. The agreement called for the supply of Hwasong-5 missiles, TELs, and HY-1 silkworm coastal defense missiles, and assistance in establishing first an assembly and then production capability for the Hwasong-5 in Iran. The exact details of the agreement are unknown; however, it is estimated to have consisted of approximately 90-100 missiles and an estimated six TELs. Within Iran, the Hwasong-5 was designated the Shahab-1 ("meteor" or "shooting star"). Upon arrival the missiles were assigned to the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force, which appears to have been expanded to brigade size and been responsible for all Scud operations against Iraq.
In 1987, the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force fired 18 Shahab-1 missiles, increasing to 40 the total number launched against Iraq to date. This probably depleted their inventory of missiles obtained from Libya and Syria.
Progress within the Shahab-1 program was relatively steady and during early 1988, Iranian officials claimed that the missile had entered production. In 1988, Colonel Rahimi, First Deputy Minister of Defense, stated "...We have also succeeded in manufacturing missiles with a range of 320km." This 320km range is the range of the Shahab-1 (i.e., Hwasong-5) and is slightly greater than the 280km of the standard Scud-B. It is unlikely that the Iranians manufactured these missiles, but rather they were assembled from components provided by the DPRK. It appears that it wouldn't be until the early 1990s that Iran would advance from assembly to production of the Shahab-1.
In the early morning hours of 29 February 1988, Iran—in its largest missile attack of the war to date—launched three Shahab-1s against Baghdad. This attack was in response to a major air attack on an oil refinery in Tehran two days earlier. Iraq quickly responded that afternoon, launching five of its new long-range al-Hussein missiles against Tehran. Thus began the second "War of the Cities." Iran's ability to conduct these attacks was primarily the result of two factors. First, was the experience gained in missile operations during the previous three years, especially by the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force. Second, it had enlarged its Shahab-1, Oghab (a 40km artillery rocket), and Shahin II (a large caliber 20km artillery rocket) inventory during 1987. By 1 April, the Iranian total had reached 258; however, only 61 were Shahab-1s, in comparison to 129 Iraqi al-Hussein missiles. From this point on, the number of Shahab-1 and Oghab launches quickly declined as Iran depleted its inventory. For a variety of reasons, Iraq—feeling victorious—declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 April 1988. The Iranians tacitly agreed and the War of the Cities was over. During the 52 days of the War of the Cities, approximately 532 rockets and missiles had been launched by both sides. Iran launched approximately 339 (80 Shahab-1s, 253 Oghabs, and 6 Shahin-IIs) and Iraq launched about 193 (189 al-Husseins and 4 Scud-Bs).
Within four months of the end of the second War of the Cities, and following a continuing string of Iraqi victories (most notably on the Fao Peninsula), Iran sued for peace. On 8 August 1988, after eight years of bitter fighting and tens of thousands of casualties, the Iran-Iraq war came to a formal end. Iran had not only been defeated on the battlefield, it had, more significantly, been defeated at home. Its economy was depleted, its civilian industry near collapse, and its population was simply exhausted from the war.
Post War Expansion (1988-Present)
Building upon the foundations established during the war, Iran's missile and long-range artillery rocket programs were reorganized during the late 1980s and have developed along two broad paths—solid-fueled and liquid-fueled systems.
The solid-fuel component built upon the foundation laid with the Oghab and Shahin-II programs and would lead to the Fajr, Nazeat, and Zelzal families of long-range artillery rockets. This effort has relied heavily upon PRC assistance. Sometime during 1988, it is believed that the PRC agreed to assist Iran modernize and expand its facilities at Parchin and Semnan to enable the design and manufacture of solid fuel artillery rockets and missiles of indigenous design. Initially it was believed that these facilities would eventually assemble and then produce the M-9/DF-15 and M-11/DF-11. As part of this effort, agreements were reportedly concluded between Iran and the PRC during 1991, 1992, and 1993 to provide Iran with technology, components, and complete M-9/11 missiles. Available information suggests that, with the exception of possibly one-two prototypes, the PRC has not delivered complete M-9/11 missiles to Iran. PRC-U.S. agreements have apparently been the primary reason for the missiles not being delivered. As a result of these agreements, the PRC refocused its efforts on assisting Iran with its indigenous short-range solid fuel systems. This assistance has included the sale of production and missile component technologies, training of personnel, construction of the Shahroud Missile Test Facility, and the assembly and production of the M-7 (a.k.a., CSS-8, 8610 or B610).
During the war, Iran's liquid fuel program had initially focused upon the production of a reverse-engineered Scud-Bs. This effort quickly floundered for a variety of reasons and was refocused on the assembly and maintenance of the DPRK produced Scud-B/Hwasong-5—known locally as the Shahab-1. This program would subsequently lead into the Shahab-2 (Scud-C/Hwasong-6) and Shahab-3 (Nodong) programs. These programs rely heavily upon DPRK and Russian technology and assistance. Although since the late 1990s, DPRK technology and assistance have been declining as Russian has been increasing. More advance liquid fuel programs include the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5. These programs are believed to rely heavily upon the assistance from numerous Russian and Eastern European entities.
During mid-2001, Iran is reported to have initiated a comprehensive review and reorganization of its diverse rocket and missile development programs. This effort is believed to have been initiated in an effort to prioritize and rationalize the entire development and production infrastructure and reduce costs. How this will affect the various programs is presently unclear.
There are conflicting indications as to the level of coordination and integration of DPRK and PRC assistance within Iran. Some sources suggest that it is very close. Other sources suggest that while Iran is receiving assistance from both the PRC and DPRK with their missile programs, the two countries are working independently, but in coordination. While the level of assistance provided by Russian entities since the early 1990s is significant, it is presently unclear as to the level of cooperation and coordination among the various Russian, PRC, and DPRK entities within Iran.
Iran's post-war missile programs have also benefited at times from bilateral cooperation with Pakistan and the acquisition of production hardware, non-restricted components, and restricted components from the former Soviet Union (e.g., Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) and European countries. In addition, Iran has made a concerted effort to lure back scientists and technical experts who fled the country at the time of the Islamic revolution. These personnel have the potential to bring back a tremendous wealth of technical expertise and experience.
By 2000, Iran's ballistic missile effort would become the "...the largest in the Middle East..." and would rival that of the DPRK in size and scope. As of late 2003, Iran possesses the second largest ballistic missile force in the third world (behind that of the DPRK) and is on the verge of developing a space launch vehicle and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
U.S. officials’ growing concerns about Iran’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction capabilities were heightened by the latest test of the Shahab-3 on 10 October 2005. This test occurred just days before a meeting was to take place between Iran and European officials to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. The test appeared to be Iran’s message to the international community that it cannot and will not be bullied.
In early November 2005, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani stated Iran had acquired the capability to mass produce its medium range Shahab-3 missiles. Early the following month, the United States placed sanctions on four Chinese and one North Korean company for supplying cruise and ballistic missile technologies and equipment to Iran. The Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance in Iran, has repeatedly pointed to cases where Iran is secretly working to develop longer-range ballistic missiles with the help of North Korea, China, and Russia. Washington hopes to build a military base in Herat, Afghanistan, 20 miles from the Iranian border, as a deterrent to potential Iranian threats.
 Martin Bailey, "The Blooming of Operation Flower," The Observer, 2 February 1986, p. 19; Elaine Scoliono, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal With the Shah," New York Times, 1 April 1986, p. A17.
 Given the state of internal affairs within Iran at the time, it is likely that progress within "Project Flower" came to a halt during late 1978.
 Missile range categories are short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM)—less than 1,000km (621 miles); medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)—1,000-3,000km (621-1,864 miles); intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)—3,000-5,500km (1,864-3,418 miles); and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)— greater than 5,500km (3,418 miles).
 Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Iraq, Iran Acquiring Chinese-Built Fighters," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 April 1983, pp. 16 -18.
 Also unknown is whether the Iranian utilized any of the personnel or facilities involved with the earlier "Project Flower."
 Typical of these reports is "Iran Goes Shopping," Foreign Report, 19 July 1984, p. 6.
 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and W. Seth Carus, "The North Korean 'Scud-B' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 177-181; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea's HY-2 ‘SILKWORM' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 5, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 8, July 1990, pp. 343-345.
 Barry Schweid, "Washington News," Associated Press, January 9, 1986; Subhy Haddad, "Iraq Says it Has Pinpointed Iranian Missile Launching Base," Reuters, March 29, 1985. The exact number of TELs and missiles obtained from the Libyans is uncertain. Estimates range from 20-50 missiles. Given the known numbers fired during the war it would appear that an estimate of 20-30 missiles is reasonable.
 "Iran-Iraq," Xinhua, 14 March 1985.
 British Broadcasting Corporation. Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4: The Middle East, Africa and Latin America, March 15, 1985, p. ME/7900/A/1. The name "Khatam ol-Anbya," was apparently the identity of the field headquarters of the Iranian military command at that time.
 "Reagan Defends Military Shipments to Iran, Restates Desirability of Worldwide Embargo," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 November 1986. These are PRC manufactured versions of the SA-7 and SA-2 SAMs, respectively.
 Pejman Peyman, "International News: Iran," UPI, 18 September 1987; "Pyongyang Missile Sale to Tehran Reported," Washington Times, 1 June 1988, p. A2; John M. Broder, "Five Key Nations Sold Arms to Iran," Los Angeles Times, 20 January 1988, p. 5; "al-Musawwar Interviews Ramadan on War," al-Musawwar, 20 May 1988, pp. 20-21, as cited in FBIS. Pejman provides two separate accounts in his report. In the first, according to an arms dealer, during June the DPRK sold the Iranians 100 Scud-B missiles. In the second, another source, allegedly drawing on information from the Iranian purchasing office in London, the Iranians purchased 90 Scud missiles from the DPRK for $500 million.
 Shahab means "meteor," "shooting star," or "burning star" in the Farsi language.
 "Radio Phone-In Program With Defense Officials," Tehran Domestic Service, 14 April 1988, as cited in FBIS.
 Actually this attack consisted of seven al-Hussein missiles. The first five were fired during the afternoon and evening of the 29th and two more were launched very early on the 30th.
 Zelzal comes from a verse in the Koran meaning "resurrection day earthquake."
 Numerous sources suggest a major PRC connection in the Iranian manufacture of Scud-Bs. These however, are incorrect. Farzad Bazoft and Allan George, "Missiles Armed With Chemical Warheads 'In Sight'," Observer, 13 March 1988, p. 23; Dilip Hiro, "Iran: Up in Arms With a Big Hand From the Chinese," Wall Street Journal, 5 June 1987; John M. Broder, "Five Key Nations Sold Arms to Iran Last Year," Los Angeles Times, 20 January 1988, p. 5; and "Iran Announces Development of Two New Missiles,".
 Press reports during the late 1980s suggesting that Iran was manufacturing the PRC versions of the FROG or Scud-B are incorrect. Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran" Meria Journal, Vol. 2, Number 2, March 1998; Bill Gertz, "China Joins Forces With Iran on Short-range Missile," Washington Times, 17 June 1997, p. A3; "Israeli Report on Nuclear Targeting Priorities," Davar, 13 January 1995, p. 15, as cited in JPRS; Douglas Jehl, "Iran is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9; Arnold Beichman, "Iran's Ongoing Arms-buying Binge," Washington Times, 4 June 1992, p. G3; Lally Weymouth, "Iran Resurgent," Washington Post, 10 April 1992; John W Lewis, Di Hua, and Litai Xue, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma," International Security, Spring 1991, pp. 87-109. The DF-15/M-9 was reported to have first been tested during June 1988, and was expected to begin production the summer of 1990. See David B. Ottaway, "China Sale Report Concerns U.S.," Washington Post, 23 June 1988, p. A33; and Michael R. Gordon, "Beijing Avoids New Missile Sales Assurances," New York Times, 30 March 1990, p. A7.
 The Shahab-4 has variously been reported as being as having a range of 2,000-2,400km with a 1,000kg warhead and being a derivative of the DPRK's Nodong or Russia's R-12 (SS-4 SANDAL). This later reference comes from sources that state that the Shahab-4 is powered by the RD-214 engine, which was originally used in the R-12. These engines were supplied by the Energomash Science and Production Association in Khimky, Russia. Steve Rodan, "Israel Differs With CIA on Iran Missiles," Middle East Newsline, 22 December 2000; "CIA Report on Iran Viewed as Confirming Israeli Concern," Yedi'ot Aharonot, 18 January 2000, p. 9; Bill Gertz, "Iran Sold Scud Missiles to Congolese," Washington Times, 11 November 1999, p. A1; Arieh O'Sullivan, "Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon - Source," Jerusalem Post, 15 September 1999; "Iran 'Armed and Safe' 20 Years After Revolution," Reuters, 7 February 1999; "Iran Delayed Missile Test Due to Problem," Reuters, 20 January 1999; "Part II of Iran's Missile Program Article," Izvestiya, 22 October 1998, p. 5, as cited in FBIS; Martin Sieff, "Iran's Long-range Missile Plans Worry Netanyahu," Washington Times, 1 October 1998; Bill Gertz, "Longer Range on Iranian Missile Shehab-4 Could Hit Central Europe," Washington Times, 29 July 1998, p. A12; Gideon Alon, "Syria, Iran ‘Stocking Up Arms'," Ha'aretz, 23 June 1998; Bill Gertz, "Russia, China and Iran's missile program," Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. A1; and Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals Contract Contrary to Official Denials," Washington Times, 20 October 1997, p. A1.
 Robert O. Freedman, "Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s" MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, June2000; U.S. Senate, Hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Subject: Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order, 15 January 15, 1992.
 "Iran Reportedly Cuts Down Production of Ballistic Missiles," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1 August 2001, p. 3, as cited in FBIS.
 "Tehran Reportedly Wants To Use Syrian Espionage Network," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 30 May 1997, p. 8, as cited in FBIS; "Russia Denies SS-4 Technology Sale to Iran," Segodnya, 15 February 1997, p. 2, as cited in FBIS; "Paper Says Iraq, Iran Trying To Acquire Armament Technology," Berliner Zeitung, 15 December 1994, p. 2, as cited in JPRS; Beichman, Arnold. "Iran's Ongoing Arms-buying Binge," Washington Times, 4 June 1992, p. G3; U.S. Congress. Statement of The Director of Central Intelligence Before The Foreign Affairs Committee US House of Representatives, 25 February 1992, pp. 7-9; Blanche, Ed. "Gulf-Iran Missiles," Associated Press, 29 January 1991; "Reviving the Force of Islam," pp. 1299 -1300.
 Bill Gertz, "Iran Missile Test Fails After Takeoff," Washington Times, 22 September 2000.